Motivated by recent interest and initiatives taken by several governments and international organizations to come up with indicators of well-being to inform policy makers, we test if subjective well-being measures (SWB) can be employed to study voting behaviour. Controlling for financial and economic circumstances, we find that when citizens are more satisfied with their life, they are also more likely to cast their vote in favor of the ruling party. We address the possible concern of reverse causality in the relationship between SWB and political support by (i) analysing the political behaviour of a sample of ideologically neutral voters, and (ii) by identifying the effect of SWB on voting intentions in individuals' response to an exogenous shock of (un)happiness (i.e. the death of husband or wife). We conclude that SWB explains voting decisions, even when the event affecting well-being is beyond government's control.
Introduction
There is a wide consensus in economics and political science that past outcomes affect current voting decisions. In particular, according to the retrospective voting literature (e.g., Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1978 Fiorina, , 1981 Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Markus, 1988 ; Lewis-Beck, 1988) voters compare past levels of utility and evaluate diagnostic information, such as macroeconomic trends and personal financial circumstances, to finally re-elect good incumbents and punish those who are believed to be corrupt, incompetent, or ineffective. At the same time the political business cycle literature (e.g. Frey and Lau, 1968; Nordhaus, 1975) has shown that policy makers, aware of this phenomenon, aim to stay in power by maximizing voters' utility before each election. The common denominator of most of the empirical studies in these literatures is the use of financial and economic indicators as proxy for voters' utility.
More recently, the idea that policy makers should consider not only monetary and financial indicators, but also rely on more comprehensive measures of well-being has become highly debated among western policy makers and scholars. Steps in this direction have been taken by the British and French governments as well as international organizations such as the World Bank, the European Commission, the United Nations, and the OECD. 1 The first aim of this paper is to investigate if subjective well-being (SWB) measures can be used to proxy for utility in addition to financial and economic indicators to infer voters' behavior. In this respect, there is growing consensus that indices of SWB constitute a reasonably good proxy for utility. 2 For example Rabin (1998) In particular, we add indicators of well-being as additional explanatory variables in standard models of retrospective voting to proxy for utility and explain individuals' voting decision, in addition to the traditionally used measures of financial and economic conditions. We construct measures of voting intentions and SWB using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a rich database started in 1991 containing information on over 10,000 British individuals on a yearly basis. Consistently with the retrospective voting hypothesis, we find that that SWB affects the probability of supporting the party of the Prime Minister together with and independently from a variable reporting the perceived improvement or worsening in family finances. Our estimates suggest that the probability of supporting the incumbent is around 1.2% higher (lower) for those individuals whose financial situation has improved (worsened) in the last year while individuals who are satisfied with their life are 1.6% more likely to support the incumbent.
An obvious source of concern in exploring the relationship between voting and wellbeing is reverse causality: those citizens, whose favorite party is in power, might become happier just because of this political success, and not as a consequence of good policies being implemented, as Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) have shown. We address this concern in two different ways: (i) by analyzing the responses of a sub-sample of ideologically neutral individuals (i.e. who do not have a priori party bias), whose well-being should not be affected by the identity of the ruling party per se; (ii) by identifying the effect of SWB on voting intentions analyzing individuals' response to an exogenous shock of (un)happiness. We consider them in turn.
Reverse causality between SWB and voting intentions can occur because some voters
may have ideological preferences for one party. Our idea is to replicate our estimations only for a subsample of respondents who are ideologically neutral (following the literature we call them swing voters henceforth). Selected questions asked in the BHPS allow us to identify these individuals: our swing voters subsample covers about 30% of the full sample. SWB measures remain very significant for this second set of estimations, but their magnitude is much larger: swing voters who are satisfied with their life are 2.4% more likely to support the incumbent. Furthermore, for the full sample, an increase of 1 unit in the reported life satisfaction raises the probability of supporting the incumbent by 0.013 standard deviations, while for the swing voter subsample this increment is nearly double. Interestingly financial situation measures become not significant.
We also carry out additional tests to compare the explanatory power of financial situation and SWB measures and their correlation. Our findings suggest that they both contributes to explain voters behavior and both should be included as regressors in the final econometric model. However SWB measures appear to be more robust.
The second way we address the concern of reverse causality is by analyzing variation in respondents' voting intentions due a shock of SWB. We exploit the fact that during the period covered by the BHPS some respondents have become widows. We take the spouse's death as an exogenous variation of SWB and we show that this variation has a negative effect on voting intentions. As widely recognized by the existing literature, widowhood has a large and temporary negative effect on well-being. We use difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis and propensity score matching to identify this effect. That is, we take those respondents in the BHPS whose spouse died during the period available in our dataset; this constitutes our treated group. We then select a matched sample of individuals who never lost their spouse, but who had the same ex ante probability of experiencing this shock. Last, we compare before-and after -the-shock changes in political support responses of affected individuals to changes in political support responses of unaffected individuals. 3 We find that subjects in the treated group are about 8% less likely to be pro-incumbent than individuals in the control group, in the following two years after the death of their spouses. A validation test for our DiD approach is provided by the estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model on the probability of incumbent support as a function of well-being, where widowhood is used as an instrument for well-being. We find that the shock on SWB instrumented in this way has a significant positive effect on voting intentions.
The above set up not only provides a way of testing for reverse causality in the relationship between voting and SWB but also allows us to address another important question still open in the literature: "Are voters able to make policy makers accountable only for increased well-being that is the direct effect of government policies?" In other words, are individuals rewarding policy makers only for the increase in SWB they are directly responsible for, or are they also responding to events independent from government actions. We assume that becoming a widow is an event largely beyond government control. Our conjecture is that if voters were able to separate the sources of their well-being, we should not observe any variation in government support after this type of event, especially after controlling for related financial aspects. Our results suggest that voters are not able to do so because they drastically reduce their support for the government after the spouses's death. Gurdal, Miller, and Rustichini (2013) suggest a rational explanation for this mechanism; they argue that blaming others for events they are not responsible for is efficient because it induces the appropriate incentive for an agent (in our case, the politician), when effort is not observable.
There is a related literature consistent with our conclusions. Achen and Bartels (2004) show that voters are more likely to oust incumbents for the economic consequences of natural disasters. Healy, Malhotra, and Hyunjung Mo (2010) explore the electoral impact of local college football games just before an election and find that a win in the ten days before Election Day causes the incumbent to receive an additional 1.6 percentage points. In the same vein, Wolfers (2009) A related literature looks at the relationship between partisanship and well-being; notably, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) show that left-wing voters' well-being is positively affected by left-wing party victory and left-wing policy outcomes (like unemployment), and the right-wing voters' well-being, by right-wing electoral victories and right-wing policy outcomes (inflation targeting). Oswald (2010, 2013) and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) show that exogenous shocks affect individuals' political stances.
Following these contributions, we test the hypothesis that the effect of SWB generated by a spouse's death on voting is different when the incumbent is left-or right-wing. We do not find any significant difference.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the data; Section 3 is devoted to the estimation the political support model; Section 4 presents the analysis of the effect of widowhood on voting intention. In Section 5, we estimate a recursive model where the equation determining how the shock affects the SWB and how the SWB affects the voting intension are estimated together. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Data
The empirical work is based on data from the 18 existing waves of the BHPS, spanning the period 1991-2008. The BHPS is a rich database collecting information on over 10,000
British residents on a yearly basis. It contains, beside well-being questions, information on political orientation and participation, voting behavior and intentions, as well as personal information on finances, jobs, family status, and region of residence.
Note that the same individuals are interviewed every year and our main variable of interest, a measure of voting intention, is asked every year: this allows us to exploit the properties of a panel. We construct this measure by aggregating the responses from two questions available in the BHPS. First, if respondents declare not to be close to or support any political parties, they are asked "If there were to be a General Election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?"
Second, if respondents declare to have some political bias, they are asked to express their party preference. By merging these two pieces of information together, we construct the variable SupportInc (support incumbent). The variable takes a value equal to 1 if the named party is the same as the national government party (i.e., Conservative Party in the period 1991-1997, and the Labour Party from 1997 onwards) and zero otherwise. Moreover, the fact that questions on party support and closeness are asked allows us to identify two groups of citizens: following the literature we define swing those respondents who are not close to any particular party (and therefore, they are likely to swing their vote from one party to the other), and partisans those respondents who have strong ex ante political preferences towards one party. The identification of these two groups will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2 and will be important for the analysis developed later in the paper.
Our key explanatory variable to analyze voting intentions is SWB. We use different proxies for it. We derive the main measures of well-being from the responses to the question "How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall?" This question is asked to all respondents every year in the BHPS starting from 1996 (with the exclusion of 1997). Respondents have seven possible categories from among which to choose, these go from 1 to 7, where #1 is "not satisfied at all", #4 "not satis/dissat", #7 "completely satisfied". Figure 1 shows the distribution of life satisfaction across British individuals interviewed between 1996 and 2008. The unconditional mean for life satisfaction reported over these years is 5.2, with a median of 5. Table 1 shows the mean of life satisfaction during the different legislatures covered by the period 1996-2008, conditional on the respondents' political ideology (they have been classified according to their answer to the above mentioned questions on political partisanship).
These statistics lead to some preliminary observations: nonpartisan voters report, on average, a lower life satisfaction than partisan voters (independent of their political orientation), and Labour partisan voters report, on average, a lower life satisfaction than Conservative partisan voters. Both observations suggest there could be reverse causality between political ideology and life satisfaction, which provides valid support to our strategy of conducting the baseline analysis on the split sample of swing voters only. As mentioned earlier, the literature on retrospective voting has recognized the importance of monetary and financial indicators in determining voting choices. Following Fiorina (1979) and many others, we use a subjective indicator to account for these monetary and financial factors, which we derive from the responses to the question "How is your financial situation compared to last year?" There are three possible answers respondents can choose from: the financial situation is better, same as, and worse compared to last year. Taking these answers, we construct the dichotomous variables BetterF in and W orseF in, taking values of one if when respondents believe that their financial situation is respectively better and worse than last year and zero otherwise.
We also compute respondents' family income in logarithmic term 4 to account for an objective measure of financial situation and we include this measure in all our estimations.
Finally, we include a set of controls that are usually employed in the literature of well-being and voting behavior: age of respondents (linear and squared), sex, marital status and income. Summary statistics for these controls are displayed in table 2.
The Models
The empirical strategy is based on testing the main assumptions of retrospective voting models using well-being measures rather than monetary and financial ones. This class of models assumes that voting decisions are based on utility comparison between different periods. Previous research testing retrospective voting models has used exclusively monetary and financial indicators to proxy for utility. Our hypothesis is that well-being indicators constitute a more comprehensive (and possibly better) proxy for utility, which takes into account all those factors that are not measurable in monetary terms. There is growing consensus that indexes of SWB constitute a reasonably good proxy for utility, (e.g., Kahneman and Thaler, 1991; Benjamin et al., 2012) . So our first goal is to test the validity of retrospective voting models, replacing/adding to financial and monetary indicators our life satisfaction measures to proxy for utility.
We proceed as follows. We first start by replicating the main estimations employed in previous research, to investigate whether voting decisions depend on evaluation of financial situation. In particular, following Fiorina (1979) , which uses subjective questionnaire responses to show that voters are more (less) likely to cast their votes for the incumbent if they believe that their financial situation has improved (got worse) compared to the past, we first estimate our traditional model (Model 1):
where SupportInc it report the voting intention described in the previous section; BetterF in it and W orseF in it are two dummy variables taking values of 1 if the respondent has replied that her financial situation is respectively better or worse than in the past, aiming to capture variations in utility due to monetary/financial components; X it is a vector of individuals' personal characteristics (age, sex, income, marital status, region of residence), note that family income is included to account for an objective measure of family finances ; η t denotes year effects; a i is an individual effect (either random or fixed); and ε it is the error term. The coefficients of interests are β 1 and β 2 . Trivially, β 1 is expected to be positive, and β 2 , negative.
Next, we replace BetterF in it and W orseF in it with our well-being measures to account for the nonfinancial component of individuals' utility. So we estimate the well-being model (Model 2):
where W ellBeing is constructed from respondents' answers on life satisfaction. The coefficient of interest is now δ, which is expected to be positive. Finally, we combine equations (1) and (2) to estimate a full model (Model 3) where both well-being and financial indicators are included as regressors:
We start off by estimating equations (1), (2) , and (3) as a linear probability model (LPM) with fixed effects (FE), to control for the within-variation effect of life satisfaction on voting behavior. However, since SupportInc it is a dichotomous variable, we also propose an alternative specification where we employ a random effect (RE) probit model for the conditional distribution of the probability that the respondent supports the incumbent party. To allow for correlation between the model's covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity, a i , we follow Chamberlain (1980) and assume the latter follows a normal distribution with linear expectation and constant variance. So we augment our model with a series of individual specific observable characteristics. 5
Baseline results
Results are displayed in tables 3 and 4. Both tables have the same format. In the first one, we present our results for the FE-LPM, and in the second one, those for the RE probit where, the average partial effect (APE) of the SWB variables are reported at the bottom of each regression. In the first column of both tables 3 and 4, we report the estimated coefficients for Model (1), the traditional retrospective voting model. In columns 2 and 3, we display the results for Model (2), the well-being model. The different columns use two variations of W ellbeing it . First, we construct a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent has chosen the answer #5, #6, or #7 to the question on life satisfaction and zero otherwise; this indicates that the respondent is satisfied with life. Second, we treat the answers (from #1 to #7) to the question on life satisfaction as a cardinal variable.
Finally, in the last two columns, we propose the results of the full model, where both well-being measures and financial indicators are included, as in equation (3). All the regressions include the same set of controls, that is, marital status, sex, age, and age squared, along with the logarithm of family income, a set of region of residence dummies, and a set of wave-dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
There are 4,882 individuals who were interviewed for the entire period and for which we have information on well-being and voting intentions. The dataset comprises nearly 50,000 observations.
Starting from the results on the traditional model, both the LPM (table 3) and probit model (table 4) estimates are in line with the basic hypothesis on the retrospective voting model, according to which one's financial situation matters for voting decisions. All the relevant coefficients are highly significant, at least at the 5% level. In particular, respondents who believe that their financial situation has improved compared to the previous year are more likely to support the incumbent compared to those whose financial situation has not changed; the estimated coefficients suggest that, approximately, the effect is a 1.3% increase in the likelihood of supporting the incumbent. Respondents who are instead worse off compared to the previous year appear to punish the incumbent by reducing the likelihood of granting their support by approximately 1.3%.
Moving to the well-being model, where measures of subjective financial performances are substituted with life satisfaction indicators, we can see that all the estimated coefficients of interest are highly significant in all our specifications, using both variations of well-being measures. The magnitude of the response is similar to those recorded for the previous model; if a respondent is satisfied with life, she will be about 1.8% more likely to support the incumbent than if not. Similarly, using life satisfaction as a cardinal variable, an increase of 1 percentage point in life satisfaction is associated with an increase of about three quarters of a percentage point in the likelihood of being pro-incumbent.
Remarkably, the coefficients related to the well-being variables for the in table 3 In the final model, we include both indicators of well-being and of subjective financial position. We find that both indicators retain the same sign and magnitude as in the previous set of regressions and they do not lose significance, which indicates that the two measures do capture different channels of support for the incumbent. It is also interesting to compare the relative importance of financial situation measures with SWB ones. For the LPM displayed in Table 3 we compute y-standardised coefficients as proposed by Winship and Mare (1984) and Long (1997) and we can see that the probability of supporting the incumbent is 0.025 standard deviations higher for those whose financial situation has improved, and 0.24 lower for those whose financial situation has worsen off compared to those whose financial situation has not changed. For SWB instead we see that an increase of 1 unit in the reported SWB (measured on a 1-7 scale) raises the probability of supporting the incumbent by 0.13 standard deviations. In summary, our results support the idea that citizens' well-being matters for voting decisions, and in particular, our findings suggest that measuring utility in terms of only monetary and financial indicators leaves out an important component, which has a significant impact on voting decisions. 9 
Reverse causality? Tests on swing voters sample
In the voting literature, ideological preferences towards one party are generally assumed exogenosly distributed within the population. Hence, some citizens are assumed to have strong partisan preferences (either towards the incumbent or the challenger) while others are more ideologically neutral. In this setting, voting decisions become the outcomes stemming from two different components, the "ideological" one coming from party bias and the "policy" one coming from government's choices. Partisan citizens will cast their vote on both grounds (ideological and policy related), and the weights on each component will depend on the intensity of their party bias. Ideologically neutral voters instead will swing their vote exclusively in response to government policies.
As we said above, partisan voters may be more satisfied with their life because their party is ruling the government. This reverse causality represents a bias for the estimation of our model; our strategy to reduce this bias is to classify voters according to their political alignment and restrict the analysis to the voting behavior of the ideologically more neutral group of swing voters. Since this type of respondents have no (or very low) ex ante party preferences, they choose whom to vote for mainly on the basis of government's policies. Two questions asked in the BHPS allow us to split the sample between partisan voters and ideologically neutral voters. The survey questions used to this purpose are (i) "Do you support any political party"? and (ii) "Are you close to any political party?" If respondents answer "No" to both, we classify their position for that year to be one of a nonpartisan voter. Almost 80% of individuals declared to be a nonpartisan at least once in the entire period. Among this group, we define the swing voters those individuals who gave such answers more than the half of median time during the whole survey, which corresponds to eight times. 6 This subsample is made out of 1,520 respondents, about 30% of the full sample. We employ it to reestimate equations (1), (2), and (3). The results are reported in tables 5 and 6, which have the same format as, respectively, tables 3 and 4. The same set of controls are used and standard errors are clustered at the individuals' level.
The results confirm our hypothesis. First, the coefficients on well-being measures in tables 5 and 6 are still very significant and, generally, higher in magnitude than those presented in tables 3 and 4; for example, looking at our preferred estimation, the RE probit in column [4] of table 6, the average partial effect for W ellbeing is now 0.0231 compared with 0.0156 in the corresponding column of table 4. 7 Second, the positive effect of improved financial situation and the negative effect of worse financial situation become non significant in all specifications.
Finally, note that in table A.1 of the appendix, as a robustness check, we report the results for the estimation of Models (1), (2), and (3) for each level of life satisfaction.
We observe a pattern consistent with a positive relationship between the probability of supporting the incumbent and the level of reported life satisfaction.
Overall we can say that, when taking out the ideological component from voting intentions, using well-being measures generates more consistent and significant results.
We interpret this as a preliminary evidence that using well-being indicators to proxy for utility is more robust than using only monetary of financial proxies. We investigate their relationship further in the next section.
SWB vs financial position indicators
In the previous section we have shown that standard retrospective voting models have Since our aim is to test how including measures of SWB affect previous standard models of retrospective voting, we follow their approach which consists on substituting the additional variable (satisfaction with life in this case) in (3) with the residuals from a regression of satisfaction with life on all the other controls included in (1) .
The output from this exercise is displayed in Table 7 . The table is divided into two vertical panels, the first one reports regression outputs for the full sample of respondents, and the second one for the swing voters sample. In each panel there are three columns, the first and the third ones, denoted [1] and [5b], correspond respectively to columns [1] and [5] For the sample of swing voters, the confounding effect of life satisfaction on financial situation is stronger, for example there is a reduction of the effect of better financial situation dummy of about 12% due to the inclusion of life satisfaction measures, but for worse financial situation dummy this reduction is over 62%.
So in summary, this exercise have confirmed that SWB measures and financial situation indicators affect voting decisions mainly through different channels, and therefore should be both included as regressors. Note also the SWB measures appear to be to some extent more robust than financial indicators.
Our identification strategy is: (i) to find an exogenous shock of life satisfaction independent from government policies and affecting only some respondents, our treated group;
(ii) to select a matched sample of individuals who did not experience this shock (matched control group), but who have the same ex ante probability of experiencing the shock (propensity score matching); and (iii), to compare before-and after-shock changes in political support responses of affected individuals to changes in political support responses of unaffected individuals (DiD estimation).
The kind of shock that allows us to proceed (i) has to have a strong and significant impact on well-being and (ii) has to be independent from government actions. Our idea is to use the death of the husband or wife as a shock of life satisfaction. This event, which is arguably largely beyond government's control, is well known to have a deep temporary impact on well-being (see for example Clark and Oswald, 2002; Clark et al, 2006) , and, interestingly, this effect is recognised to be stronger for women than men (Clark et al, 2006) . So, widowhood fits well our purpose because it is possible to identify its exogenous component by using propensity score matching and, at the same time, it is largely beyond the government's control.
Propensity Score Matching
In order to be able to analyze the response to negative shocks of life satisfaction, such as those caused by an event like widowhood, we need to deal with two problems. First, a direct comparison between treated and untreated individuals is biased by the fact that differences across these two groups depend on selection. Second, the time of the treatment is respondent specific and cannot be imputed for the members of the nontreated group.
Propensity score matching provides a solution to both problems. It involves relying on a set of observable characteristics that affect the "probability of being treated" (propensity score) in an attempt to reproduce the treatment group among the nontreated. Imputation of the time of treatment to the members of the control group is therefore made by pairing each of its individuals with a member of the treated group. Becker and Hvide (2013) use a similar approach to match firms with a deceased entrepreneur with firms where the organization never experienced a similar shock. In our setting, we use year of spouse death of treated respondents to impute the counterfactual year of spouse death of the matched control. So, in this way, we are able to define before and after spouse death for both treated respondents and matched controls.
We use nearest neighbor matching to select the group of individuals whose probability of experiencing widowhood between 1992 and 2008 (the whole length of the BHPS), conditional on characteristics observed in 1991, is the closest to that of the 363 individuals who did experience widowhood over the same period. 10 We begin computing the propen-sity score by estimating a probit for the likelihood of becoming a widow. Table 8 provides evidence of the good explanatory power of the chosen covariates, given the significance of their coefficients and the high pseudo−R 2 of 0.30. 11 The predicted probabilities estimated from this model constitute our propensity scores. Before matching, the average propensity score is 0.352 for the treated group, and only 0.073 for the nontreated group. After imposing a radius of 0.01 for the identification of the nearest neighbor to any individual belonging to the control group, we discard 134 individuals and remain with a sample of 230 respondents (153 of these are women and 77 men) who did experience widowhood and 230 matched respondents who didn't. In the matched sample, the average propensity score is reduced to 0.1963 for the treated group and 0.1952 for the control group. ( Figure   3 in the appendix provides histograms for the estimated propensity score before and after matching.) Table 9 reports statistics for the reduction in bias attained through the matching procedure: it reports the test of equality in the means of all used covariates across the treated and control groups, both before and after matching. The results from the last column suggest that, for all covariates, we fail to reject the null of mean equality after the matching procedure is concluded. (Figure 4 in the appendix provides a graphical representation of the same bias reduction)
DiD Setup
In section A.2 of the Appendix, we can observe that the shock of SWB following the spouse's death is negative and significant; it is stronger for women than for men, for whom in our sample it is nonsignificant, and it seems to be fading away with the years from the event. This is perfectly consistent with previous research (Clark et al., 2006) .
Our main focus is now to understand whether the spouse death affects voting behavior such that it is decreasing with time following the event and, in general, follows a pattern similar to the shock in SWB. We are mainly interested in the differences after the event (the death), but we also look into the behavior before the death. As we will show there is no different behavior before the death which is consistent with the fact that the matching procedure has effectively worked by selecting individuals who do not have pre-treatment differences, even if the death is preceded by long period of illness.
We start by looking at the basic DiD regression, where we compare treated and matched controls to assess how voting intentions are affected by a spouse's death (treatment). We estimate the following model:
The coefficient of interest is λ 2 , which measures the difference between treated respondents and control respondents after the treatment. The coefficient λ 1 also presents some interest because it constitutes a test for the lack of pretreatment effect. We include all the controls that have been previously included in the regressions; these are age (in linear and squared form), logarithm of family income, sex, as well as year and region dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We estimate equation (4) using LPM.
Equation (4) is also extended in several directions to include some of the shock's characteristics that are formally reported in the appendix. First, since the shock turned out to be significant only for women, we look at the responses of men and women separately. We do it in two ways: (i) by interacting af ter it × treated i by sex of the respondent dummies;
(ii) by running separate regressions for male and female respondents. Second, since the shock of wellbeing lasts for only two years after the death, we look if treated respondents differs from the control group only in the same period of the shock. To address this we estimate separately the effect on the year of the death, and 1 and 2 years after.
Finding that the effect on the probability of supporting the incumbent in the treated group lasts as long as the shock on life satisfaction and finding that the effect on women is stronger than in men, would allow us to attribute the effect of the treatment on voting intention to the shock of unhappiness.
DiD Results
We analyze whether individuals experiencing widowhood change their voting intention differently from individuals whose spouses do not die. Estimation results for equation (4) and its variations are displayed in tables 10, 11, 12, and 13. In most of our regressions, we consider windows of three and two years after and before the spouse death, but we also experiment with shorter and longer periods.
Columns [1] , [2] , and [3] of table 10 present the results for λ 2 when the data are restricted to respectively 4, 3, and 2 years after and before the treatment. We can observe that overall, there is a negative effect of widowhood on the probability of incumbent support; the effect is increasing and becomes significant in the sample of the two-year window (column [3] ), from where we observe that such a shock decreases by about 8% the probability of voting for the incumbent. In columns 4 and 5, we obtain more precise estimates of the effect's duration, by estimating different coefficients for the year of the spouse death, {1,2} years after, or simply 1 and 2 years after. The effect of the shock seems to be decreasing, consistent with the effect on the life satisfaction shock. In these first five columns, we impose the restriction that men and women react in the same way to the spouse loss.
Columns [6] to [10] repeat the estimates of columns [1] to [5] , after relaxing the restriction of homogeneous treatment effect by gender. We estimate different coefficients for men and women in the treated group. Consistently with the asymmetric shock of life satisfaction that hits the two sexes differently, the results show clearly that women are the ones whose voting behavior is affected by the spouse death; the λ 2 are negative and become significant when we restrict the sample to two or three years from the treatment.
Again, we first start by estimating a common λ 2 for all years after the spouse death. The results suggest that women are about 7% to 9% less likely to vote for the incumbent following the death of their husband. When analyzing the duration of the effect, we obtain significant and negative coefficients for women in the year of the event (about -11%) and in the following year (about -12%) and a smaller nonsignificant effect two year after the event (about -5%). Coefficients for men are smaller and nonsignificant.
As a robustness check, we run separate regressions for men and women. The results are displayed in tables 11 and 12. From the inspection of the tables, we can clearly see that all the previous results are confirmed in terms of both magnitude and significance.
We can also observe that our matching technique has not left any pretreatment effect, in Section 4.2 we have shown that there are no differences between control and treated group at the beginning of the period. When we estimate (4) we also carry out tests that the two groups remain comparable in the periods before the treatment, to make sure that there are no pre-treatment differences between the two groups. The coefficients λ 1 presented in the first row of tables 10 to 12 show that this is indeed the case. To provide further evidence we interact the pre treatment period with pre-treatment years before {1,2, 1-2} dummies. The results displayed in the tables are again consistent with the assumption that there is no pre-treatment effect.
So we have shown that an exogenous shock of well-being affects voting intentions.
This can be interpreted as a further evidence that SWB affects voting. Moreover, given that the death of the spouse is an event that is independent on government's action, we can conclude that voters blame (or reward) the government for actions/events it is not responsible for.
Heterogeneous Responses to Left-and Right-Wing Parties
One could argue that a well-being shock could affect an individual's political bias rather than simply her support for the incumbent. As shown in Oswald and Powdthavee (2010, 2014), a shock that makes the individual more (less) needy might increase (decrease) her support for a left wing party (i.e. the Labour Party in our case). Ideally, we would test whether individuals react differently to left and right governments by reestimating equations (1), (2), and (3) separately for the samples of Labour and Tories legislatures.
Unfortunately, our data source provides us with well-being responses covering only one
year (1996) of the Tory legislature, which opens a series of problems, particularly for the FE estimates of the LPM. As an alternative, we choose to reestimate equation (4), which employs data for the whole period 1992-2008 and, therefore, allows us to analyze the behavioral responses of respondents over the six years of Conservative against the eleven years of Labour legislature.
If Labour policies were more favourable to widows than Conservative policies and if voters were sensitive to this difference, then we should observe widows being more likely to support the incumbent during Labour legislatures than during Conservative ones. Observing no difference in the effect of widowhood on voting behavior among the two parties would instead bring evidence in favor of the "blaming" effect discussed in the previous section. Table 13 presents our results. Columns [1] to [5] estimate the same models as the corresponding columns of table 10, with the addition of the interaction of the after treatment dummy with a temporal dummy identifying whether the government in power is led by the Labour Party. As we can see, the results seem to confirm our hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the two legislatures. The interaction of the after treatment dummy with the Labour temporal dummy is always nonsignificant. Column [5] suggests that the probability of supporting the incumbent in the first year following a spouse's death is 0.182 lower for the control than for the treatment group. This coefficient is comparable in magnitude and significance with the effect found in column [5] of table 9, our preferred specification (see also column [10] of the same table). Column [6] tests for the presence of pretreatment effect, and again finds that voting behavior changes only after the spouse's death.
Widowhood as an Instrument of SWB
The analysis presented so far relies on the underlying assumptions that experiencing widowhood directly affects subjective wellbeing. To further support the assumptions that motivated our identification strategy, we estimate a model where widowhood is explicitly used as an instrument for life satisfaction. Accounting for the fact that both the outcome variable, SupportInc, and the endogenous variable, W ellbeing, are discrete, we choose to estimate the following recursive bivariate probit model on the full sample of just above 4,800 individuals:
where 1i and 2i are jointly distributed as bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances, and correlation ρ. 12 In this specification, the equation for well-being can be interpreted as the first step of an instrumental variable two-stage procedure, where widowhood plays the role of an exogenous instrument. The linear alternative to this specification (a standard IV-OLS model) provides consistent estimates of the average treatment effect, but is biased and has low small sample performance. 13 The results from the estimation of this model are presented in table 14, where we only show the estimated relevant parameters. Model (1) is estimated on the full sample. The negative ρ reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the estimated correlation between the errors of the two equations (which is the conditional tetrachoric correlation) is negative and highly significant. The table additionally confirms that experiencing widowhood has a negative and significant effect on well-being, which, in turn, has a significant effect on the probability of supporting the incumbent. These results confirm our previous findings and validate our DiD approach.
Conclusion
Motivated by recent initiatives taken by governments and international organizations to come up with measures of SWB to yield informed policies that integrate standard monetary and financial measures, we test if well-being data can be used to predict voting behavior.
Our aim was to contribute to the empirical literature on retrospective voting by augmenting standard models of voting behavior with measure of well-being to proxy for utility. Preliminary results suggest voters change their voting intentions in response to changes in their level of life satisfaction.
There are two main sources of concern that we address in the paper. The first one is the possible reverse causality between voting and well-being when political ideology enters into the equation, as has been noted elsewhere (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005).
For example, a strong Conservative supporter may be happy when the Tories are in power and not because of specific policy choices implemented by the party. We address this issue in two ways:(i) we split the sample between swing and partisan and we show that the swing react more to a SWB shock-the opposite behavior would have been true if our result was due to reverse causality; and(ii) we use widowhood as an instrument to better identify the model.
Once established that SWB measures are good indicators for predicting voters' behavior, we proceeded in the direction of asking whether or not voters are able to correctly reward or punish the incumbent government only for the variation in life satisfaction that is directly imputable to government actions. People's happiness may indeed depend on several factors and many of them are not directly imputable to government action. To address this, we test whether or not widowhood affects voter's preference toward the in-cumbent. We use DiD estimation and propensity score matching to identify the effect that widowhood has on the probability of supporting the incumbent party. We find that a 1-point decrease in life satisfaction measured on a 7-point scale corresponds to a 12% decline in the support of the incumbent party. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the effect of widowhood on the SWB follows the same pattern as the shock on the support for the incumbent. We confirm the above results by estimating the effect of the shock on SWB and on the incumbent support together in a bivariate probit analysis.
We believe that our results have some important implications. First of all, they motivate the efforts taken by governments and international organizations in producing better and more comprehensive measures for well-being, since they appear to be valid indicators of what voters want, which is consistent with retrospective voting models. Second, they highlight citizens' inability to correctly blame or reward policy makers only for the actions they are responsible for. Finally, we note that this can provide an explanation for why elections are always held in May (in the UK), when the sun shines high and makes everybody happy! Financial Situation: Better 0.0132*** 0.0126*** 0.0125*** (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) Worse -0.0131*** -0.0120*** -0.0117** (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) Satisfaction with Life: Satisfied [5, 6, 7] 0.0185*** 0.0161*** (0.0051) (0.0051) Satisfaction with Life: [1,2,. . . ,7] 0.0075*** 0.0065*** (0.0020) (0.0020) 1,520 respondents who are classified as "Swing voters'. All specifications include auxiliary control variables (a dummy for "married" individuals, the natural logarithm of yearly household income, age, age squared, and a dummy for female respondents). Region and wave dummies are always included. 
0.043
Note: Sample composition is 230 treated and 230 matched control individuals; Models [1] and [2] further restrict, respectively, to four and three years before and after spouse death; Models [3] to [10] restrict to only two years before and after spouse death. OLS estimates are based on the regression showed in equation 4 (SupportInc
, where af ter it is set to 1 in the years after spouse death. All specifications also include auxiliary control variables (a dummy for "married" individuals, the natural logarithm of yearly household income, age, and age squared). Region and wave dummies are also always used. Standard errors are clustered by respondent and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 to four and three years before and after spouse death; Models [3] to [6] restrict to only two years before and after spouse death.
OLS estimates are based on the regression showed in equation 4 ( 
A.2 The Effect of Widowhood on SWB
To support the validity of our empirical strategy, we show in this section that widowhood actually constitutes a negative shock to life satisfaction, measured by self-reported subjective well-being. Using our matched sample, we run a difference-in-difference model to compare the effect widowhood had on the life satisfaction of the individuals who did experience such a shock to the effect such an event would have had on the counterfactual group. The respondents included in the analysis are the same used for the analysis in Section 4, but the sample is restricted to the years following 1996, as that is when we start observing SWB.
The study by Clark et al. (2008) shows that reported life satisfaction starts decreasing in the two years preceding the death of a spouse, reaches its lowest peak during the year of the spouse death, and then quickly readjusts toward the average level during the two years following the loss of the spouse. To test that our dataset also follows the same pattern, we estimate the following model:
The coefficient of interest is σ 2 , which is the effect of widowhood on well-being for those individuals whose spouse died. We estimate several variations of this model, which include interacting treated i both with the sex of the respondents as well as with dummies indicating the number of years after the event, {year of the death}, {1, 2, 3, or 4 years after}.
The results for this exercise are reported in table A.2. Overall, in line with previous research, the shock of unhappiness is only significant for women, and it is reabsorbed after two years from the event. There is no evidence of a significant difference in the level of well-being between the treated and control groups three years from the event. The sample used is restricted to 4 years before and after the event. All specifications also include auxiliary control variables (a dummy for "married" individuals, the natural logarithm of yearly household income, age, and age squared). Region and wave dummies are also always used. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parentheses. *significant at * 10, ** 5, *** 1%.
